Doctoral programs are important for national talent cultivation. The recruitment of doctoral candidates is the first step to ensure the cultivation quality. By applying the theory of information economics, we study the information asymmetry confronted by applicants and supervisors under three recruitment mechanisms, namely Direct Doctoral (from Bachelor to PhD) Program, Master’s & PhD Combined Program (successive postgraduate and doctoral program), and open PhD candidate recruiting, and try to put forward solutions. Taking into account the practical conditions in China, for the first mechanism, it is suggested to improve the training mechanism for undergraduates’ research ability to facilitate the evaluation of applicants by supervisors; for the second mechanism, it is suggested to enhance the management of the progress of the master program, which is helpful for applicants and supervisors to know each other; and for the third mechanism, it is suggested to regulate the content and submission procedure of the recommendation letters to reveal the research ability of applicants. The present paper offers a suggestion for the reform of the recruitment mechanisms of doctoral candidates with a view to improve the quality of doctoral program and enhance the core competitiveness of China.