期刊信息

  • 刊名: 河北师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版)Journal of Hebei Normal University (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)
  • 主办: 河北师范大学
  • ISSN: 1000-5587
  • CN: 13-1029/C
  • 该刊被以下数据库收录:
  • AMI综合评价(A刊)核心期刊
  • RCCSE中国核心学术期刊
  • 中国期刊方阵入选期刊
  • 全国百强社会科学学报
  • 中国人民大学“复印报刊资料”重要转载来源期刊

宋代豪民与官吏勾结对国家的内耗性分析

收稿日期: 2003-07-29
  • 作者单位: 1. 武汉大学 历史学院,湖北 武汉,430072;
    2. 河北宣化师范学校,河北 张家口   075000
  • 起止页码: 134 - 139

The collusion of the rich with officials and the national weakness in the Song Dynast

摘要/Abstract

摘要:

宋代乡村豪民势力得到了很大发展。这些豪民的存在对封建政权起着不同程度的破坏作用:其一,表现为直接与官府对抗;其二,更多地表现为豪民与胥吏、官僚因缘为奸,共谋私利。宋代豪民的猖獗限制了宗族势力的发展,而地方宗族势力的弱势又限制了分裂中央政权的地方力量,相当于扼杀了皇帝的竞争对手,从而在客观上维系了赵宋皇权的延续。豪民之间的自私自利又决定了其难以形成集团力量,他们同官吏之间的相互利用造成了国家的内耗和民怨的沸腾。

Abstract:

The rich farmers in villages are considerably developed of the Song Dynasty, who are a sort of sabotage to the feudal power due to the following reasons. First, they are a direct resistance with the of ficials. Moreover, they conceive conspiracy with the officials in one way or another, so as to limit the power of the imperial clan. The lessened regional power, in turn, helps dwindle the regional power to split the central power, and thus strangling the opponents of the emperors, and helping the imperial power to con- tinue. All this results in the national weakness and grassroots complaints.