In the management and administration of land during the Song Dynasty(960-1279),thegovernment consistently played a dominant mole.Whether through altering the operationa modes of state-ownedland—shifting from direct state management to tenant famming—or through the sale of state-owned land,thestate's primary consideration was profit.Vanious land policies introduced during the Song Dynasty faciliatedthe transfer of land rights in multiple forms,all of which were driven by this objective.In tems of fiscaldistribution,a continuous interplay of interests existed between the central and local governments from theNorthern to the Southern Song Dynasty.In the early Northern Song Dynasty,local govemments maintainedaccumulated reserves,and the annual tribute quota to the central govemment was a fixed amount.However,particulary after the reforms of Wang Anshi(王安石),the fiscal autonomy of local governments was graduallycurtailed.In the context of land rights transfers,the central government's concern was not who held the landrights,but rather the ultimate destination of fiscal revenues.Consequently,the central government pursued aland policy of“not restraining land annexation”to encourage the circulation of land rights,whilesimultaneously breaking established norms to centralizelocal revenues,thereby reinforcing fiscal centralization.