The choice and validity of debt covenants is the result of contract selection under the principle of minimum transaction cost, and the status of debt covenants depends on the characteristics of the traders such as ownership type and subject rating of issuing enterprises. Based on theoretical analysis, the following conclusions are obtained through empirical evidence. First, compared with private enterprises, debt covenants are more conducive to reducing the financing cost of state-owned enterprises, but the probability of state-owned enterprises adding this clause is lower than that of private enterprises. This stems from the implicit threshold for bond issuance debt covenants and transaction cost of commercial paper and the different signals sent to investors by companies of different ownership types. Second, the effect of adding debt covenants to reduce financing cost in state-owned enterprises is more pronounced among high-credit subjects. Third, the level of state-owned enterprises also affects the financing cost of issuing enterprises. The identity of central state-owned enterprises can help reduce the financing cost of state-owned enterprises, but they are not sufficient to affect the financing cost effects of debt covenants.