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在线阅读 --哲学社会科学版 2020年2期《意识问题的现象学与心理学视角》
意识问题的现象学与心理学视角--[在线阅读]
倪梁康
浙江大学 哲学系, 浙江 杭州 310028
起止页码: 1--17页
DOI: 10.13763/j.cnki.jhebnu.psse.2020.02.001
摘要
关于意识,目前有两个基本的定义:第一,主观体验;第二,信息。这两个定义代表了意识理论研究的现状,也指明了意识研究未来可能的发展方向。前一个意识定义是意识哲学与意识现象学的,后一个意识定义是生物学和物理学的,心理学的位置处在两者之间,因而它既在一定程度上接受前一个定义,也在一定程度上接受后一个定义。后一个意识定义是可能的,但无法取代第一个定义。事实上这两个定义不能相互还原。只是对这一点还需要做原则性的论证。无论如何,在意识问题成为热门的课题的当下,要想理解意识,我们需要在现有的意识心理学和意识现象学之外另立一门新的意识科学。

The Psychological and Phenomenological Perspectives of Consciousness
NI Liangkang
Department of Philosophy, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, Zhejiang 310028, China
Abstract:
To date, we have two fundamental definitions of consciousness:1. subjective experience; 2. information. The two definitions represent the status quo of the theoretical studies of consciousness, and they also point out the possible direction of the study as such in the future. The former definition belongs in the philosophy of consciousness and phenomenology of consciousness, the latter in biology and physics. Psychology is situated between them, so it accepts both definitions to a certain extent. It is my contention that whereas the second definition is possible, it cannot replace the first. De facto, the two definitions cannot be mutually reduced, as to which, of course, principle demonstrations are supposed to be done. At any rate, I will give an affirmative answer to this question:at present when consciousness becomes a hot topic, do we need to set up a new science of consciousness outside the existent psychology of consciousness and phenomenology of consciousness so as to understand it?

收稿日期: 2019-11-10
基金项目:

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